Research Agenda
My research focuses on the strategies business and labor employ to deal with the political, economic, and technological challenges presented by globalization. I have two main research agendas.
What Business Wants: The Politics of Labor Reform in Portugal and Spain
My book project examines labor market reforms in these two countries during the Eurozone crisis as the golden opportunity for political elites to change the economic growth model of the country. However, I show that change was met with opposition from the majority of employers, and I challenge two long-held views about business’ responses to economic pressures: that business prefer the liberalization of industrial relations, and that the sole advocate of coordination is the export industrial sector. Critically, a novel argument emerges from my dissertation, with direct relevance to economic and labour policy. I claim that business preferences for collective bargaining vary with firm size. This is due to Portugal and Spain’s particular economic structure. While the two countries are usually singled out for the prevalence of micro and small firms, this is not unlike other European countries. What sets them apart is that firm size is more strongly correlated with productivity, and that smaller firms in these two countries concentrate most of the employment. This has two relevant consequences: there is no one-size-fits-all type of sectoral collective agreement, and smaller firms are an important constituency in the employers’ associations in charge of collective bargaining. Thus, larger firms are more likely to opt-out of collective agreements and negotiate their own contracts. I test this theoretical framework using a “most-similar systems” research design in Portugal and Spain during the 2011-2015 Eurozone crisis. In each of these cases, I collected original data on the drivers of business preferences and reconstructed the process of negotiation and implementation of labor reforms. Over 12 months of fieldwork in the two countries I conducted 135 elite interviews with high-level politicians (including current and former prime ministers and ministers), policymakers, leaders of business associations and labour confederations, and representatives from international institutions, among others.
Über-State: The Political Economy of Platform Capitalism
This research project advances a theoretical framework to understand the politics around platform firms, exploring three angles: the power of these firms, the way this power allows them to take over core state functions, and how these technology entrepreneurs organize to advance their preferences. In a first paper I provide an explanation for a surprising outcome: the inability of Uber to achieve deregulation, and its adaptation to national rules. I argue that platform-firms do not have structural power (as their exit options are weak), and instead they must construct a distinct type of power—that I label “infrastructural power”—that requires the cooperation of the state. In a second paper, I delve deeper into the construction of that power, as I examine these firms’ unique capacity to take on core state functions. I argue that this is a distinct process from traditional privatization. I show these different features in the analysis of three tasks performed by these firms: the collection of information about the people that inhabit the nation, the creation of connections among residents, and the provision of security. In a third paper, I study the organization and influence of this new capital. Economic elites’ capacity to advance specific policies has for long been an important focus of political science research. However, technology entrepreneurs appear to be a distinct type of elite, with distinct preferences and a distinct type of power.
What Business Wants: The Politics of Labor Reform in Portugal and Spain
My book project examines labor market reforms in these two countries during the Eurozone crisis as the golden opportunity for political elites to change the economic growth model of the country. However, I show that change was met with opposition from the majority of employers, and I challenge two long-held views about business’ responses to economic pressures: that business prefer the liberalization of industrial relations, and that the sole advocate of coordination is the export industrial sector. Critically, a novel argument emerges from my dissertation, with direct relevance to economic and labour policy. I claim that business preferences for collective bargaining vary with firm size. This is due to Portugal and Spain’s particular economic structure. While the two countries are usually singled out for the prevalence of micro and small firms, this is not unlike other European countries. What sets them apart is that firm size is more strongly correlated with productivity, and that smaller firms in these two countries concentrate most of the employment. This has two relevant consequences: there is no one-size-fits-all type of sectoral collective agreement, and smaller firms are an important constituency in the employers’ associations in charge of collective bargaining. Thus, larger firms are more likely to opt-out of collective agreements and negotiate their own contracts. I test this theoretical framework using a “most-similar systems” research design in Portugal and Spain during the 2011-2015 Eurozone crisis. In each of these cases, I collected original data on the drivers of business preferences and reconstructed the process of negotiation and implementation of labor reforms. Over 12 months of fieldwork in the two countries I conducted 135 elite interviews with high-level politicians (including current and former prime ministers and ministers), policymakers, leaders of business associations and labour confederations, and representatives from international institutions, among others.
Über-State: The Political Economy of Platform Capitalism
This research project advances a theoretical framework to understand the politics around platform firms, exploring three angles: the power of these firms, the way this power allows them to take over core state functions, and how these technology entrepreneurs organize to advance their preferences. In a first paper I provide an explanation for a surprising outcome: the inability of Uber to achieve deregulation, and its adaptation to national rules. I argue that platform-firms do not have structural power (as their exit options are weak), and instead they must construct a distinct type of power—that I label “infrastructural power”—that requires the cooperation of the state. In a second paper, I delve deeper into the construction of that power, as I examine these firms’ unique capacity to take on core state functions. I argue that this is a distinct process from traditional privatization. I show these different features in the analysis of three tasks performed by these firms: the collection of information about the people that inhabit the nation, the creation of connections among residents, and the provision of security. In a third paper, I study the organization and influence of this new capital. Economic elites’ capacity to advance specific policies has for long been an important focus of political science research. However, technology entrepreneurs appear to be a distinct type of elite, with distinct preferences and a distinct type of power.